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The work of John Maynard Keynes shows us that counter-
cyclical fiscal policy and an easing of austerity may offer a
way out of Eurozone crisis
Debates between ‘Hayekian’ and ‘Keynesian’ perspectives constitute one of the main
conceptual fault-lines of the Eurozone crisis. In the second of two EUROPP articles covering
this debate, Simon Wren-Lewis looks at how the current programme of austerity and the
view that the private sector can do little wrong may be driving the continent further into
recession. Policymakers must instead embrace the Keynesian response of counter-cyclical
fiscal policies.
This art icle f irst appeared on the LSE’s EUROPP blog
Let’s begin by imagining that the Eurozone was a single country, like the United States. The US is
currently undertaking signif icant austerity, even though there is no market pressure to do so. In f act,
quite the opposite is the case – it is an excellent t ime to borrow to invest. So why are the US, and also
the UK, undertaking austerity? The main argument is that government debt is too high.
The Keynesian response is that this is the wrong time to be worrying about government debt. In a
recession which is due to an increase in private sector saving, the government needs to run matching
def icits to prevent output f alling. For the world as a whole, if  government def icits come down, private
sector surpluses must f all to match. Normally monetary policy would encourage the private sector to
save less by lowering real interest rates. However in many countries the monetary authorit ies have
already lowered nominal rates (almost) as f ar as they can. In addition these authorit ies, or their
governments, seem unwilling to let real interest rates f all by encouraging above target inf lation in the
f uture.
Advocates of  austerity argued that reducing government debt would encourage private spending by
boosting conf idence. This was always an argument of  hope over both theory and evidence, as the last
two years has shown. So the only way the private sector surplus can f all to match lower public sector
def icits is f or output and incomes to f all, which prolongs and intensif ies the recession.
This argument against austerity now is quite compatible with a view that government debt is much too
high f rom a longer term perspective. It is all about choosing the right t ime to deal with that problem. Fiscal
policy should be countercyclical, not pro-cyclical. Polit ical economy arguments that we should ‘not waste
a crisis’ while there is polit ical will to reduce debt seem logically f lawed. Austerity should also not
be surrogate f or attempts to reduce the size of  the state.
Following the Great Depression, Keynes taught us the need f or countercyclical f iscal policy when
monetary policy is absent or inef f ective. Keynesian economics is hardly a school of  thought,
but mainstream macroeconomics, as contained in nearly every textbook, and as practiced in nearly every
central bank. That does not prove it is right, but it increases the personal responsibility of  policy makers
who choose to ignore it.
With this perspective, f iscal policy in the Eurozone as a whole seems particularly misguided. Overall
government def icits as a share of  Eurozone GDP are much lower than in the US or UK, yet the speed of
f iscal consolidation is more rapid in the Eurozone. The obvious question is whether this can be explained
by the f act that the Eurozone is not one country.
Private or Public Sector Profligacy
The story told by many is that the Eurozone crisis is a result of  f iscal prof ligacy in some countries, and
the need to put that right quickly because of  market pressure. This account misses two essential
underlying causes of  the crisis, which have to be recognised if  a solution is to be f ound. The f irst
missing element is competit iveness. In my view f iscal policy in many Eurozone countries outside Germany
was insuf f iciently t ight bef ore 2008, but f or most not because it implied a build up of  government debt. 
The problem was that private sector demand was too strong, encouraged by large capital inf lows f rom
abroad and real estate bubbles.
Here again a classic Keynesian perspective is instructive. In a monetary union, f iscal policy has to take on
a major countercyclical role in response to large idiosyncratic shocks. Yet this was hardly acknowledged
in the original Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and does only slightly better in the current set of
Eurozone f iscal rules. I have argued that, by ignoring countercyclical f iscal policy, the SGP encouraged
governments in periphery countries to allow a growing loss of  competit iveness to persist. In that sense,
ignoring basic Keynesian ideas helped cause the Eurozone crisis.
The second key f eature of  the current crisis is also a result of  excess private sector demand in
periphery countries, and that is a banking crisis. This, rather than f iscal prof ligacy, was the major cause
of  the crisis in Ireland, and likewise in Spain. Economic and polit ical f orces then led to governments
bailing out their banks, and it is this which put into question the sustainability of  government f inances.
Recognising these two aspects of  the crisis is crit ical in analysing solutions. Yet they do not provide a
complete answer to why interest rates on the debt of  so many Eurozone countries are so high. As
French polit icians have observed, their f iscal data looks better than in the UK, so why have they lost their
triple AAA status while the UK retains theirs? The answer is that the UK has its own central bank, so that
the worst f orm of  def ault that lenders to the UK can suf f er is inf lation.
Helping or Harming Periphery Countries
Recognising this last f act means that there was, and still is, a very simple and ef f ective solution to the
immediate Eurozone crisis, and that is f or the ECB to undertake a programme of  Quantitative Easing
(QE) f ocused on markets where interest rates were inappropriately high. There is a deep f ear in all
central bankers about f iscal dominance, but that has not prevented QE in the US and UK, because those
programmes are designed to be reversible once they are no longer needed (or if  inf lation becomes a
threat).
The main reason this has not been done by the ECB appears to be a concern about moral hazard: that
without market pressure, governments would lose their incentive to undertake austerity and structural
ref orms. (There is also a concern about ECB balance sheets, but this just seems to misunderstand what
a central bank is.) There are two quite reasonable responses to this concern. First, in a crisis, moral
hazard concerns have to be put on one side, as central banks recognise in a f inancial crisis. The f ire
engine does not drive slowly to the f ire to encourage others to be caref ul. Second, data on underlying
primary balances clearly shows that all periphery governments have already undertaken a massive
amount of  austerity.
These moral hazard concerns are misguided f or a more f undamental reason: they misdiagnose the key
problem as public rather than private sector prof ligacy. Intervention by the ECB to lower interest rates on
government debt today is unlikely to encourage excessive private sector spending and lending during the
next boom.
The ECB should have recognised that QE directed at high interest rates on government debt
was consistent with its mandate, because these interest rates were causing unnecessary def lationary
pressure in the economies concerned. The route European policy makers instead took was to replace
market f unding of  def icits by intra-governmental f unding, with strict conditionality. This has been a
disastrous policy f or three reasons.
First, it does nothing to deal with the f undamental causes of  the crisis. You do not encourage the
countercyclical f iscal policy required to moderate private sector booms by making f iscal policy more pro-
cyclical. In addition, creating major recessions in these countries makes it more, not less, likely that banks
will be bailed out.
Second, governments have been f orced to implement austerity programmes that have been much too
draconian. While an appropriate austerity programme would eventually have reduced def ault risk
(although only af ter a considerable period, once debt itself  began f alling), f orcing excessive austerity
has in some cases made the short term problem of  def ault risk worse. Not only have domestic
recessions created by austerity increased the size of  bank bailouts, but in the case of  Greece excessive
austerity has generated polit ical instability which also increases def ault risk.
Third, it has turned a crisis of  market conf idence into a distributional struggle between Eurozone
countries, which could threaten the cohesion of  the Eurozone itself .  The ‘you will have to
leave’ threats to Greece are just a particularly nasty manif estation of  this.
The essential problem is lack of  competit iveness outside Germany. Although this requires def lation,
there are two simple reasons why it should be gradual rather than sharp. The f irst is the Phillips curve:
gradual def lation to adjust the price level is much more ef f icient. The second is aversion to nominal wage
cuts, which makes getting signif icant negative inf lation very costly.
An Anti-Keynesian School
If  the ECB had capped bond yields f or Eurozone economies, might austerity in the Eurozone as a whole
been less rather than more rapid than in the US or UK? Unf ortunately there remains an underlying
problem, which is a f ailure in Europe to acknowledge the macroeconomic impact and importance of  f iscal
policy in a monetary union. A good recent example is the Netherlands, where contractionary f iscal policy
was implemented despite f alling GDP, rising unemployment and no market pressure. As I argued above,
the new f iscal rules continue to ignore the need f or countercyclical f iscal policy, which helps explain pro-
cyclical f iscal policy in countries like the Netherlands.
There is a second occasion when f iscal policy should be used in a countercyclical manner, besides
preventing divergences in competit iveness. This is when aggregate monetary policy loses its power to
stabilise the Eurozone as a whole, because interest rates hit a zero lower bound. Again, this is textbook
stuf f  (thanks to Keynes). This is where the Eurozone currently f inds itself , yet its f iscal rules
are pushing countries in the wrong direction. The more countries like Germany apply austerity, the
more dif f icult adjustment outside Germany becomes.
Why does this simple logic continue to be ignored by Eurozone policymakers? There was a f ear when
the Eurozone was set up that allowing countercyclical f iscal policy would lead to def icit bias, because
governments would spend in recessions but not save in booms, and union would reduce market
discipline. This last point now seems a litt le ironic, as we currently have too much market discipline. Yet
the f ocus on government prof ligacy ef f ectively meant that governments ignored the possibility of  private
sector prof ligacy, which turned out to be the greater problem.
This is not to deny that long term def icit bias is a serious issue, both in the Eurozone and outside. This
is most ef f ectively tackled in my view through a combination of  appropriate long term f iscal rules and
national f iscal councils that can police those rules. However f iscal rules within a monetary union should
also encourage governments to set countercyclical rather than pro-cyclical f iscal policy.
There is an underlying pattern behind Eurozone policy errors. They ref lect a view that macroeconomic
dif f icult ies are primary due to bad government decisions, while private sector decisions within a f ree
market environment do not create problems. Whatever label we want to give this view (Ordoliberal orAnti-
Keynesian), it is the f undamental cause of  the current Eurozone crisis. Its persistence despite all the
contrary evidence allows the crisis to continue and threatens the integrity of  the Eurozone itself .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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